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By comparing the cities of Cardiff and San Sebastián-Donostia (Donostia), we argue 
that local governments’ capacity to co-opt provides a valid framework to understand 
changes in citizen participation under fiscal austerity. The argument is based on the 
close interrelationships among co-optation, legitimacy and procedural regulation 
(Selznick, 1949). These concepts help to understand how citizen participation is 
maintained in periods of instability, experienced by city governments during and in 
the aftermath of extra-local financial crisis. We argue that local government’s 
legitimacy is maintained insofar as it shows capacity to co-opt, defined as practices 
and processes of negotiation, capture, ‘technicalization’ and minimization of conflict. 
These elements work in tandem with those factors that have been identified in cities 
experiencing austerity under a longer-term neoliberalizing discourse (Peck, 2012). 
The interwoven framework between capacity to co-opt and ‘austerity urbanism’ is 
used to understand not only variation across the two cities in their administrative 
processes, but also to unpick the contradictions that emerge in practice during the 
liminal time between fiscal crisis and normality (Bayirbag et al., 2017).  
The comparison is interesting as both cities symbolize the pride (‘the jewel of the 
crown’) necessary to sustain the national identities of Wales and the Basque 





maintain co-optive and regulatory powers is shaped by their constitutional inter-
dependence with national and subnational tiers of government - which have 
protected them against or delayed the effects of the 2008 financial crisis. 
Furthermore, both cities’ reliance on the tourism industry (sport, culture or 
gastronomy) and their lack of mass protest, albeit for different historical reasons, 
contribute to frame the debate on how participation unfolds in periods of fiscal 
austerity.  
The paper is structured as follows.  It first presents a framework of co-optive 
capacity, which is then juxtaposed with the factors comprising Peck’s austerity 
urbanism under neoliberalism. This is followed by a brief contextualization of each 
city’s fiscal structuring, political ideology and participatory structures, providing a 
foundation for the subsequent findings which contrast the two cities and discuss how  
‘austerity co-optive’ factors develop in practice. Finally, the implications of the 
findings are considered, including reflections on the significance of the juxtaposed 
framework of co-optive capacity under austerity. 
 
B. Co-optation, legitimacy and regulation 
Recent studies of austerity and crisis have focused on the variegated effects of 
urban austerity (Bayirbag et al., 2017; Peck et al., 2013). The procedural 
administrative mechanisms used by local government to cope with this type of 
phenomenon have received less emphasis. In addressing this gap, we use the term 
austerity to refer to the fiscal austerity that many local authorities in Spain and the 
United Kingdom have experienced as a result of the 2008 financial crisis. Fiscal 





resources of local authorities which directly affect service provision; and changes in 
the discourse (policy and practice) of austerity, materialized in policy documentation 
and administrative arrangements that regulate the extent to which responsibilities are 
downloaded and offloaded.  
We focus on co-optation, procedural regulation and legitimacy as mechanisms to 
establish social order (rules) by local governments through their governing 
processes of service provision in periods of fiscal austerity. We treat the three terms 
as complementary insofar as governments are compelled to show they have 
capacity to govern not only to respond to people’s needs, but also for residents or 
constituents to recognize or legitimize governments’ role and authority (Selznick, 
1949). Selznick defines formal co-optation as ‘the process of [publicly] absorbing 
new elements into the leadership of a policy-determining structure of an organization 
as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence’ (1949:13). Hence, co-
optation ‘fulfils both the political function of defending legitimacy and the 
administrative function of establishing channels of communication and direction’ 
(1949:14).  
Selznick’s definition is appropriate for our analysis as it centres on daily bureaucratic 
processes (i.e. selecting citizen collaborators, implementing project objectives) 
related to the democratic ideal of local participation.  The administrative function of 
co-optation is highly interlinked with a local authority’s capacity to govern, which we 
understand as the ability and resources to formulate, monitor and enforce rules that 
regulate processes of service provision (Levi-Faud, 2014; Menahem and Stein, 
2013). Meanwhile, regulation is understood as a set of local procedural norms, 
practices and organizational arrangements that are the outcome of coordinated 





Following Selznick’s argument, the links between capacity to govern and co-optation 
become evident when government invites the participation of organized civil society 
and organic community groups into (a) the provision of services and (b) the 
formulation and monitoring of rules of service provision. We argue that in periods of 
fiscal crisis, the capacity to govern can be interpreted as a capacity to co-opt insofar 
as government actors perceive that their legitimacy is called into question as a result 
of diminishing financial resources to govern. Their legitimacy may also be questioned 
in relation to the increased role of civil society groups, invited to participate in service 
provision before or during the crisis.  
To understand capacity to co-opt it is important to unpack Selznick’s definition of co-
optation. For this purpose, we deploy four elements drawn from debates in public 
administration which are significant to understand participation under urban austerity. 
The first is the assumption that co-optation implies some degree of negotiation 
between a powerful and a less powerful party. Hence co-optation implies an unequal 
relationship portrayed as domination through justificatory means (legitimacy). In 
particular, we are interested in relationships between government officers and 
citizens found in debates regarding clientelism and patronage (Auyero, 2011; 
Selznick, 1949). The second is capture of non-governmental actors and their 
resources into state-sponsored initiatives. Such capture may involve either corrupt 
practices such as offering public monies in exchange for political support and tactics 
that limit input of rival parties (Attuyer, 2015), or ‘law-abiding’ practices that gradually 
convince the less powerful party to adopt the beliefs and practices of the powerful. 
All types of capture contribute to maintaining or building government’s legitimacy.  
The third element is ‘technicalization’ (Kothari, 2005) of service-delivery processes 





of democratic participation and neoliberalization co-exist (Clarke and Newman, 
1997). Technicalization pinpoints practices related to the ‘monopolization of 
expertise and authority by professionalizing interventions of state actors’, which, at 
least initially, tend to be alien and incomprehensible to non-state actors or citizens, 
thus limiting their ability to develop critical, challenging or emancipatory approaches 
(Kothari, 2005). Finally, co-optation aims to minimize or buffer conflict during 
processes of service provision, albeit never eradicating it completely (Spicer, 2010). 
The minimization of conflict is not necessarily negative (i.e. limiting emancipation, 
depoliticizing a process). The buffering of conflict may be positive, such as to avoid 
violence, promote respect of (regulatory) processes ‘despite detestation of their 
outcome’ (i.e. electoral results) or to sacrifice everyday commitments ‘for the long-
term preservation of allies’ (Hampshire, 1999:49-50 & 73). These four elements feed 
into our framework to understand variation in capacity to co-opt. 
 
B. Neoliberal austerity and co-optive capacity 
Neoliberal reforms - ‘deregulation’ of the economy, decentralization and offloading of 
responsibilities, and internationalization - have restructured the state’s role from 
provider to facilitator, associated with roll-back and roll-out strategies adopted by the 
state (Jessop, 2002; Peck and Tickell, 2002); and from facilitator to disciplinarian 
(Wacquant, 2010). It has been widely acknowledged that there has not been a 
withdrawal but a restructuring of the state’s role, which has inevitably resulted in 
degrees of conflict or resistance by incumbent elites (Robinson, 2004; Harrison, 
2010), tiers of government (Newman, 2014), and marginalized groups (della Porta 





Conflict and resistance against neoliberalism have been present over the last 40 
years, albeit in some cases not manifested as protest or riot (Morton, 2003; Tonkiss, 
2013), nor seeking transformation (Dikeç and Swyngedouw, 2017). It is in such 
cases that local governments are more successful in implementing co-optive 
mechanisms to capture dissidents and gradually convince them to adopt processes 
of governance that have commonly accompanied neoliberal governing regimes, 
characterized by waves of roll-back and roll-out strategies (Brenner et al., 2010; 
Davies, 2011; Swyngedouw, 2005). In epochs of financial crisis, conflict and 
resistance have taken the form of protests and riots by the marginalized in important 
urban centres.  But in secondary European cities where mass protest has not 
occured, such as Cardiff and Donostia, the conflict has been encapsulated in 
governing decisions by incumbent government elites that invite participation and 
volunteering.  Co-optation is based on our assumption that as crises (financial 
included) bring uncertainty (Bayirbag, et al., 2017; Peck et al., 2013), the governance 
mechanisms that local governments use to establish participation destabilize, such 
as procedural-administrative regulations that contribute to building local 
government’s legitimacy on a daily basis.   
Our approach contributes to broader discussions about urban austerity. We find that 
it speaks to the ‘boundaries’ and ‘politics’ elements of framing urban crisis suggested 
by Bayirbag et al. (2017). These authors argue that crisis needs to be ‘differentiated 
from its antonyms, normality or equilibrium’, by paying careful attention to the liminal 
time between crisis and normality (2017:8). By focusing on these two cities, the co-
optive capacity framework provides a way of understanding how such ‘liminality’ 
fares across space and time. Focusing on liminality helps to unpick the 





argue is important to understand neoliberalism’s durability and recurrent 
contradictions (Cahill and Konings, 2017; Tonkiss, 2013). 
The 2008 financial crisis in the western hemisphere has posed challenges to the 
neoliberal state and consequently brought the strategies and mechanisms through 
which regulation can function into question. Peck (2012) posits that these challenges 
would be felt primarily by subnational levels of government, particularly those located 
in urban settings which have concentrated partnerships and contracted-out forms of 
organization in service provision.  He argues that one of the effects of fiscal austerity 
on neoliberal strategies and projects has been the deepening of decentralization 
through devolved fiscal policies or ‘soft budgetary measures’.  These distribute 
financial risk in the delivery of services from national to regional and local levels 
(downloading) and from the local level of government to community/ third sector 
organizations (TSOs) and private sector contractors (offloading). For Peck, austerity 
urbanism is about ‘making others pay the price of fiscal retrenchment’ (2012: 632) at 
any scale of action. The ways that ‘others’ (non-state actors) ‘pay the price’ is 
context-contingent.[1]  
Four of the seven factors which comprise Peck’s austerity urbanism (2012) are valid 
here given their relationship with co-optive capacity: rollback redux, risk-shifting 
rationalities, austerity governance and placebo dependency. They are valid as they 
are more strategic than the other three (downsizing and leaner local states, fire-scale 
privatizations and financial tournaments), which are more tactical. 
Peck’s analysis is useful as it provides a comprehensive framework that 
acknowledges the different dimensions of the state’s reconfiguration.  However, it 





contradictions in which the austerity discourse is immersed and the way it is 
grounded in different contexts. Given our focus on co-optation under austerity, we 
develop a framework that juxtaposes Peck’s four factors with the four co-optive 
elements discussed in the previous section (Table 1). 
Rollback neoliberalism has been explained by Peck and colleagues (Brenner et al., 
2010) as the rollback of the state in providing specific goods and services.  It was 
followed by a rollout wave of state restructuring since the 1980s which paved the 
way for the downloading and offloading of state responsibilities to third sector and 
community organizations, encapsulated in the proliferation of public-private and 
community-public partnerships across different cities in the western hemisphere. The 
rollback redux, derived from the 2008 crisis, aims to roll back the strategies rolled 
out a generation ago. For example, the state has withdrawn grants formerly made to 
community groups to build community-public partnerships but seeks to maintain 
collaborative links with the community to carry on delivering local services.  Links are 
clear with the capacity to co-opt.  For example, it can be argued that the rollout 
process worked as a way of capturing dissident citizens, while beginning to prepare 
them for the technical and expert knowledge required for inter-sectoral collaboration 
to occur (Barnes et al., 2007; Kothari, 2005). In preparing for the rollback redux, 
interdependency and organizational mimicry (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) between 
state actors and citizens also developed. Thus any conflict associated with this 
process tends to be concentrated at the implementation stage (Spicer, 2010). 
Peck identifies austerity governance when forms of management by audit and rule 
by accountancy are consolidated, an interpretation discussed in detail by scholars of 
public administration and development studies. Such managerial practices are 





non-state actors (Clarke and Newman, 1997; Kothari, 2005), through for example 
‘data generation for new forms of state management, new ways of managing 
expenditure, [or] meetings to discuss outputs and inputs into administrative systems’ 
(Harrison, 2010:108).  These  practices are also associated with ‘new public 
management’ which with economic globalization has reached countries beyond the 
global north (Jreisat, 2001)..  It is the technicalization of everyday practice, through 
the rule-making and rule-monitoring required to manage and coordinate the delivery 
of collaborative services, which highlights the links to co-optive capacity. 
In the global north, the responsibility to couple managerial processes with budgetary 
constraints has been downloaded to subnational levels of government. Peck terms 
this risk-shifting rationalities, where city governance management processes  
promote deployment of downloading and offloading tactics. Thus  professionalizing 
and technicalizing interventions are not only passed down from national to 
subnational levels of government, but also from state to non-state actors. 
Expenditure management and monitoring of processes to achieve outputs and 
outcomes starts being conducted by TSOs, which play an intermediary role between 
the state and community actors (Bovaird, 2014; Chaskin and Greenberg, 2015).  
While aiming to pass responsibility to third sector and community organizations, 
Peck argues that it is likely that the poorest of the population will be impacted the 
most as they tend to have fewer skills and resources to take on the state’s 
managerial responsibilities. In response, governments have identified the need to 
recruit officers whose skills span organizational or sectorial boundaries to bridge the 
requirements of government with the interests or needs of non-state partners (Pill 
and Guarneros-Meza, 2017; Skelcher et al., 2013). In particular, these officers seek 





regulations established by the (local) state as a way to ensure co-optation. However, 
this process allows room for negotiation and consequently tensions may traduce into 
conflict as non-state actors pursue tactics and mechanisms of self-management that 
question those sponsored by the state (Elwood, 2006). 
Peck argues that placebo dependency arises when local government shows an 
increasing mismatch between its capacity to act locally to achieve economic growth 
and social development and the imperative ‘to be seen to be acting’ locally (2012: 
648). This term is useful because to continue co-opting, government wants to be 
seen, despite the challenges brought by fiscal austerity, to be doing something. In 
periods of uncertainty this is often as important as getting a result. However, the 
nature of the mismatch between capacity and imperative to-be-seen-to-be-acting 
locally will depend on the approaches to fiscal austerity that different cities 
experience and adopt. Barbehön and Münch (2015: 13) argue that ‘although…global 
financial and economic crisis is translated into local funding crisis…this is done very 
specifically and in accordance with locally specific wider narratives’ shaped by 
discourse and stakeholders’ daily interpretations. For these authors, austerity 
discourses can create narratives of reinvention, exploit previously existing narratives 
or react with narratives that blame or protect the city from external threats caused by 
the dominance of financial capitalism. We argue that these narratives can be 
combined, especially over time.  Local governments at first may show resignation to 
fiscal austerity. Over time as they comply because of a lack of a perceived viable 
alternative – coined ‘austerity realism’ (Davies and Thompson, 2016) - they reinvent 
or build upon existing narratives that develop through administrative processes and 
which help to maintain their legitimacy. When this assemblage of narratives is 





empower TSOs or community groups, while changes to procedural regulation 
deepen downloading and offloading mechanisms that may contribute to co-optive 
capacity. 
[Table 1 here] 
 
B. Comparing Cardiff and San Sebastián-Donostia 
The rationale deployed to develop the comparison draws from ‘comparativism’ 
(Robinson, 2011), an approach which moves away from traditional patterns centred 
on similarity and standardization. Instead, it focuses on differences, albeit centred on 
a similar problematic. Two simultaneous but unrelated aspects led us to compare 
Cardiff and Donostia. The first was both cities’ protection from or delayed effects of 
the 2008 financial crisis upon their budgets; the second was the lack of mass protest 
in the two cities, in contrast to those which occurred in large cities such as London or 
Madrid against some of the effects of fiscal austerity upon the population (i.e. 
withdrawal of social and housing services).  
Cardiff is the nation’s capital and largest city of Wales (population 346,000, 2011 
Census). It seats the national (regional) government, Welsh Government; hence the 
city is well known for its service economy centred on public sector activities and 
services such as insurance, real estate, sport and cultural tourism and gastronomy.  
Donostia is capital city of Gipuzkoa Province, located just over 100km east of Bilbao. 
It has historically been recognized as a locus for luxury tourism, cultural activities (in 
2011 it was awarded the 2016 European Capital of Culture) and high-end 
gastronomy. It has 186,126 inhabitants and the metropolitan area has 436,000 (2016 





[Insert map here] 
To situate the problematic that encompassed both cities in line with the 
comparativism approach requires a contextual review to help identify difference in 
processes and practice.  Four aspects are relevant to our argument: the fiscal 
structure of the city and region; the political ideology of the governing elites; their 
duration in holding office; and the institutionalization of citizen participation within the 
cities’ governance. The latter is important after cycles of mining and separatist 
protests waned in Wales (1980s) and the Basque Country (1990s), respectively. 
Analyses of the 2008 financial crisis highlight the Basque Country and Navarra as 
the autonomous regions that encountered the least negative economic impact 
across Spain. This is a result of the regions’ economic diversity, including stable 
export markets and a low dependency on the construction sector (Méndez et al., 
2015). According to the National and Basque Institutes of Statistics, by 2012-13 
Donostia showed higher levels of GDP per capita and household income and the 
lowest rates of unemployment than the rest of the Basque Country and Spain. 
Concomitantly, these two regions have a relatively high level of fiscal autonomy 
compared to other autonomous communities in Spain. This enables a revenue 
system (50-60 per cent above average) to respond to agreed and convened 
decisions taken by their national assemblies and provincial councils, which have 
favoured welfare policies in the last two decades (Cordero Ferrera and Murillo 
Huertas, 2008:14). An exception, however, is observed in the diminishing 
expenditure on public infrastructure which affected the Basque and local tiers of 
government. The unique circumstances in welfare have protected several Basque 
cities from the negative impacts that the crisis generated for social and housing 





social services, though it did undergo cuts to other services such as street 
maintenance. Moreover, the broader discourse of austerity that Spain experienced 
impacted the politics and management of the city’s participatory system, especially in 
urban planning.  
In contrast, Wales lacks independent tax raising powers from Whitehall, London. Its 
fiscal dependency led its public services to enjoy initially a relative protection from 
austerity derived from the 2008 financial crisis; partly due to the time lag in English 
cuts feeding through the formula used to set Wales' funding.  These cuts cascaded 
to Welsh Government in its 2014/15 budget.  Financial allocations to local authorities 
were considered 'by far the worst settlement since devolution' with severe budget 
cuts of over 5% in real terms for 2014/15, rising to 9% by 2015/16 (Henry in Pill and 
Guarneros-Meza, 2017).  Budget cuts of some £100 million were sought in the 
following three years by Cardiff Council.  Welsh Government ministers and local 
politicians blamed the UK government for these cuts.  As a result, Cardiff Council 
has looked to rationalize and reorganize public services, taking advantage of its city-
wide governance model and the Cardiff Debate, a citizen consultation exercise, 
which helped the council to prioritize service provision, especially of community and 
social services, in the 2014/ 15 budget. ‘Rejecting austerity altogether was not an 
option and therefore the future structuring and operation of the council’s policy-
making had implications for participatory governance’ through co-production with and 
commissioning of services from civil society organizations and community groups 
(Pill and Guarneros-Meza, 2017).   
Between 1991 and 2015, Donostia was ruled either by party coalitions or minority 
governments led by the two main Left political parties: the non-nationalist Basque 





(Bildu). Despite the differences between parties, the overall political ideology of the 
city has shared a relatively critical posture against neoliberal policies impacting the 
local welfare state, while promoting citizen participation. However, the lack of 
absolute majorities in government necessitated the Left’s engagement in continuous 
negotiation with other Right-centred political parties (Tellería and Blas, 2016). Cardiff 
since 1995, has been mainly dominated by the Left through the Labour Party, over 
time the local council’s power has shifted from a strong majority to a simple majority 
(just over 50% in 2016). During our study, the Labour party showed internal divisions 
between two historical factions: one against budget cuts to social services related to 
leisure, sport and libraries; and the other in favour of these cuts.  However, since the 
1990s both factions have been supportive of the neoliberal boosterist vision pursued 
in developing and regenerating the city through private housing and infrastructural 
investment (Morgan, 2006; Cardiff Council, 2007). 
Citizen participation has been emblematic of Left parties in the Basque Country and 
replaced long cycles of separatist protest supporting Euskadi Ta Askatasuna. The 
structure of citizen participation flourished in Donostia when PSE-EE took office in 
1991. Bildu was in power during the period of study and its administration (2011-
2015) was characterized by the introduction of more radical participatory plans and 
programmes than the PSE-EE, in response to the formal institutionalization of the 
local 2007 participatory regulation and law. The Bildu government aimed to create a 
systemic participatory structure to overcome fragmentation through city-wide 
participatory budgeting and a strategy that supplemented the accountability of 
representative government with state-sponsored innovations of participation. This 
strategy sought to enhance the social capital of civil society and encourage a 





plans, but also could make decisions within the policy making process. Examples 
included: Auzolan, a neighbourhood regeneration communitarian project; Villa 
Alegría-Txantxarreka, a community centre run by the youth assembly and other 
grassroots groups; and Casa de las Mujeres, a programme run in a council building 
by the city’s feminist movement. However, projects co-produced by local government 
and citizens and civil society associations were found to be closely aligned to the 
management objectives followed by the local council. By the end of the Bildu 
administration, a city-wide participatory strategy had proved difficult to implement, in 
part due to historical differences between the central and peripheral areas of the 
metropolitan zone.  
In contrast, citizen participation in Cardiff has not been emblematic of the Labour 
Party, instead collaboration and partnership have been the preferred terms in local 
discourse. Since 2000, citizen participation in the city has been coupled with 
partnership working through the national poverty reduction programme, Communities 
First (CF). Cardiff holds a handful of highly deprived areas that have been part of the 
CF. CF partnerships were developed involving grassroots groups and activists who 
depended on resources from the Welsh Government and local council to develop a 
range of projects to improve education and health across the vulnerable population. 
The result after 10 years of sponsorship has been empowerment of several civil 
society groups that have learned to work and co-produce with the (local) state. Over 
the past few years, partnership working has culminated in a collaborative model, 
Cardiff Partnership, which through a multi-agency body composed of governmental 
and umbrella civil society organizations has aimed to identify and tackle policy 
challenges related to housing, social care and anti-social behavior. The model also 





a key element of the model, the council has considered it inclusive of citizens as civil 
society organizations and CF partnerships have become central in delivering 
neighbourhood services, especially since the financial crisis. The local council has 
also promoted other participatory initiatives such as citizen panels, meetings and 
consultations, but these have been carried out in a fragmented way responding to 
specific policy needs regarding planning, policing, and neighbourhood renewal.  
Fieldwork in the two cities was conducted through semi-structured interviews (24 in 
Donostia and 29 in Cardiff) between summer 2013 and spring 2016. Through a 
snowballing technique, we interviewed social activists and TSO officers, state 
officers involved in citizen participation and social service provision, and local 
politicians.[3] The first stage of data collection comprised an exploratory approach to 
understanding citizen participation; this was followed by further interviews with local 
actors who played an important role in the citizen participation process of each city; 
and the final stage followed up specific processes relevant to each city, wherein  
some participants were interviewed for a second time. All interviews were audio 
recorded and transcribed. The transcribed data were coded deploying terms 
selected to unpick the daily practices of capture, technicalization, negotiation and 
buffering conflict, as contained in the framework of co-optive capacity. These terms 
were: rule making, rule monitoring, risk management, selection of collaborators, 
determination of goals, resource management, and procedural learning. The 
analysis in the next section is based upon a systematic coding of these terms across 
all 53 interviews conducted in both cities. The interview quotes in the next section 
were deliberately selected to emphasize the particularities we wanted to underline in 






B. Discussion of findings 
Because of the period in which data were collected, an analysis of the initial, liminal 
responses (i.e. the transition from fiscal pre-austerity to post-austerity) of both city 
governments and their impact upon citizen participation is discussed. The analysis is 
structured by the austerity co-optive factors presented above. Each of the four, 
paired factors is not evenly manifested between the two cities. This is to be expected 
because the comparative rationale departs from a similar problematic and focuses 
instead on specific contextual factors. 
C. a) Preparing for rollback redux or flexing the muscles of ‘capture’ 
Like the rest of the UK, the pre-austerity period in Cardiff was characterized by 
partnership working between the state and local communities/TSOs. It was a period 
during which models of roll-over funding by the state (national and local) to 
community groups and TSOs were very common. This created TSO financial 
dependency upon the state, while the inculcation of civil society co-responsibility was 
being developed. It was a process of ‘making people more responsible’. A similar 
experience is observed in Donostia, where partnership working between the public 
and third sectors before 2010 was highly promoted. This characteristic has not been 
unique to Donostia, but to the whole Gipuzkoa Province (Arrieta Frutos and 
Etxezarreta Etxarri, 2012). 
By the time budget cuts reached Cardiff, the responsibilization of civil society had not 
reached the levels of autonomy desired. As one local council officer put it: ‘We’re not 
as good at engaging with the communities as we could be.  I still think that we’ve got 





budget cuts, this officer concluded ‘I think things are definitely changing [becoming 
less dependent]’ (GO/C_1). 
Therefore, the start of the austerity period was characterized by a transition in the 
allocation of funds; from a grant recipient model of funding that rolled over funding 
from state to civil society agencies to a very prescriptive service delivery model, 
where TSOs or equivalent were essentially tied to the processes that the local 
council wanted these agencies to pursue. As Cardiff Council envisaged its budget 
cuts, it began thinking of new ways to tighten control of TSOs through the Cardiff 
Partnership. Social activists were critical of this model, one stated: 
Increasingly I think the [Welsh] State is most comfortable relating to 
organizations that mirror itself and many of the big NGOs have essentially 
adopted a statist bureaucratic set-up even though they’re doing voluntary sector 
work.  They set themselves up with a Chief Executive and a hierarchy and so 
on and everything is done by staff rather than people on the ground.  People 
are reduced to the role of volunteers.  But the Council is much more comfortable 
largely often because they’re often funding them or have until now funded those 
things. (SA/C_1) 
Such ‘mirroring’ was acknowledged by council officers and a wide range of TSO 
officers, who had worked in the city for a decade or more, some of them former 
members of grassroots groups. A similar experience was observed in Donostia; this 
is boldly put by a municipal councillor who was critical about the fusion between the 
two sectors: 
the third sector has been captured [by the administration] and public 





to delegate responsibility to the third sector as opposed to assuming it.  
(P/D_1) 
In Donostia the austerity narrative impacted the municipal government’s practice 
through a re-centralization of social assistance. For example, municipal government 
ceased sponsoring soup kitchens managed previously by faith groups and instead 
subsidized individuals directly to help them buy food. It also halted a concession of a 
youth community centre formerly ran by civil society associations. Re-centralization 
was driven partly by government officers’ interpretation of the rights discourse, who 
believed that the ‘Council has to guarantee social rights’ of its residents. We 
observed that in the social services arena, Donostia Council was trying to find a 
balance between the pre-austerity partnership arrangements established with TSOs, 
while not letting any opportunity pass to recapture responsibility.    
In both cities, preparing for the rollback redux also implied new organizational 
arrangements in the running of community centres. Although the foundation of 
community hubs predated the impact of the budget cuts in Cardiff, it presaged these 
by helping to legitimize downloading and offloading tactics by making collaboration 
and co-production visible to the public eye. This was the case of the Ely and Caerau 
Community Hub which housed public sector providers, TSOs and community groups 
together in a single building. Multi-agency teams from all these sectors were 
collaborating in the provision of community services. In Donostia the Casa de las 
Mujeres provided a similar example; the management of administrative practices to 
promote women’s rights in the city was co-developed between community groups 






C. b) Technicalization and professionalism as a means to ensure co-optive 
capacity  
The preparation for rollback redux developed in both cities during the pre-austerity 
years, from neighbourhood mobilizations and protest to their formalization into 
neighbourhood associations or TSOs. Their formalization required daily rule-making 
and rule-monitoring.  Through following specific processes in their organization (i.e. 
reporting, establishing objectives and welcoming state funding), many of these 
groups and TSOs started to be invited into the cities’ council meetings. They learned 
how to engage in dialogue with council officers; hence, the gap in managing 
processes for social service provision between council and these TSOs began to 
narrow. 
A municipal government officer in Donostia clearly illustrates this point: 
If we want citizens to develop their ideas we include them in a grant-funding 
system. The grant-funding system is…madness. I mean: piles of paperwork, 
incredible bureaucracy…then they prepare it, we ask them eleven thousand 
papers that must be ordered in a certain way otherwise they do not pass 
[requirements]. (GO/D_1) 
In Cardiff, technicalization was found through TSOs that were highly merged into the 
CF system and Cardiff Partnership. One TSO officer explained how in becoming part 
of Cardiff Partnership his organization had to show managerial capacity to comply 
with the requirements of corporatism: 
Part of the condition of us running it [CF programme] was that we'd have 
extensive governance, we went through a due diligence process in terms of 





plan.  We've done all that, it's progressed well, we're running the [CF] cluster, 
manage the area…. So being financially sustainable, but being well-governed, 
well-managed, effective, credible, valued, respected… We have that structure 
and then we can be creative, we can go off and be wild community workers.  
(TSO/C_7)   
In both cities, all types of interviewees perceived bureaucratization and its 
associated technicalization as negative. In particular, project beneficiaries and 
activists accused those establishing these processes of ‘turning community groups 
into the council’. But as the previous quote illustrates, in Cardiff, TSO-CF officers 
also recognized the benefits of ‘becoming more corporate, with more structure’.  
While our data in both cities confirmed the pre-austerity period helped TSOs and 
community groups to align their operative and monitoring processes in ways that 
mirrored council practices (i.e. aligning objectives, preparing business cases, 
monitoring user feedback, running best practice and fundraising workshops), the 
Cardiff case is revealed as more systematic than Donostia. Cardiff’s experience 
yields three important points to highlight, the first also evident in Donostia.  
First, as TSOs’ ideas began to infiltrate the policy circles of city governance, they 
had to become more business-like to be able to influence implementation of 
particular projects. Second, the start of the austerity period did not only reify the 
alignment of TSOs’ processes into Cardiff Council’s ways of doing things, but also 
became an opportunity to influence new processes that budget cuts demanded, such 
as commissioning of social services from TSOs and community groups. With regards 





So it's not just about what you do to survive, it's about what you do to take a 
little step back and say, how do you put in- what you can put in to this, in a mix 
with what can be commissioned, and how do you influence what they are going 
to be commissioning?  They [Cardiff Council] appreciate that at that level, 
because other than that, they're commissioning into a vacuum.  So if they're 
beginning to think about commissioning and you're giving them a whole load of 
information and evidence about what's needed to support older people, then 
that's going to become part of their whole ideology. (TSO/C_3)   
Third, the budget cuts prompted the need for new procedural regulation to guide the 
operation and management of service commissioning from TSOs and asset transfers 
from local council to private and community groups (i.e. libraries or community 
centres). This required the production of training and guidelines that up-skilled small 
TSOs and community groups to take on responsibility for service provision that the 
council and other TSOs relying on government funding, were no longer able to 
provide. Some of our interviews with government officers and politicians assumed 
that the city council had to be in charge of designing this regulation to ensure that 
small TSOs or community groups working at a neighbourhood level complied with 
employment, health and safety, insurance procedures, and safety checks of 
volunteers dealing with vulnerable users (i.e. children). This type of regulation was 
part of the offloading with which civil society had to be ready to comply. However, 
Cardiff Council was not fully prepared and started to work on it in 2015 with the 
publication of the Stepping Up Toolkit (Cardiff Partnership, n/d). For some citizens, 
such guidelines were important to avoid a ‘state of anarchy’, for councillors and 






C. c) Risk-shifting and the challenges of buffering conflict 
The professionalization and technicalization of TSOs was facilitated in both cities by 
the passing of responsibility from state actors to non-state actors; but only in Cardiff 
through the CF programme was it evident that risk was being downloaded and 
offloaded:  from the Welsh Government, to Cardiff Council to TSO-CF. 
In Donostia, risk-shifting across levels of government showed in some instances a 
contrary tendency, that of re-centralization and upward shifting as a way of 
streamlining processes. For example, the management of basic income benefits was 
withdrawn from municipal government and instead began to be administered by the 
Basque-national government. And as mentioned earlier, there were instances where 
municipal government absorbed social-assistance costs (i.e. food vouchers) that 
side-lined the work of some TSOs. However, the preference for a paternalistic 
approach did not stop Donostia Council from experimenting with offloading risk. This 
was clear through the Energy Waves Programme, which as part of the European 
Capital Culture Award, provided small grants to citizen groups and shifted part of the 
cost from the council to the citizenry. La Casa de las Mujeres was another example 
as staff recruitment costs were handled by the women’s association. 
In contrast, Cardiff Council’s reduced budget prompted the council to integrate CF 
partnerships into the broader city governance model. This passed the management 
costs to TSOs (redundancy and HR management), while the Welsh Government 
maintained the operative costs of the programme’s activities. The latter arrangement 
helped the council to reduce its costs and the liability of unemployment. Although 
risk-shifting deepened as a result of budget cuts, the city council was also providing 





and support to ensure that the managerial and operative responsibilities they 
inherited from the council complied with monitoring, audit and outcome 
requirements. A council officer explains:  
It is working really, really well because it means clusters [TSO in charge of CF] 
are going to carry on doing what they want without the confines of a big political 
organization [city council], but they have the support from a big organization in 
the assistance of process and audits which are not their strong points. 
(GO/C_2) 
TSOs in charge of managing and implementing CF envisaged their role as short 
term, especially because of reductions in public expenditure that funded many of 
these TSOs previously. Hence, one of the activities carried out was the 
empowerment of communities to become self-governing and entrepreneurial by 
becoming less financially and operationally dependent on TSOs and government. 
Examples mentioned mainly addressed youth services: holiday provision, leisure 
activities (music) and language skills.   
In Cardiff, the sharing of responsibility and risk-shifting was encompassed initially by 
the rhetoric of ‘co-production’ and while it reduced the risk borne by the city council,  
it was coupled with the challenges and threats to the council that buffering conflict 
involved. First, a sense of empowerment by local TSOs and community groups was 
identified during fieldwork. TSOs/ community groups interviewed felt they were 
influencing the council’s way of thinking through the design of new procedural 
regulation that was needed after commissioning or by gauging opportunities to 
introduce innovative practices. The fieldwork period also coincided with several 





activities not only increased awareness of the effects of budget cuts, but also made 
ordinary citizens and communities feel empowered, albeit temporarily, especially 
after the local council voted in spring 2015 in favour of prolonging resources for 
some community services to run for another financial year.  
Second, as the offloading process continued, Cardiff Council realized that in many 
cases communities did not know how to run community services, and also lacked the 
resources and time to do so. Local council officers made efforts to approach citizens 
and explain the fiscal crisis the city was facing. As a result, the council received 
expressions of interest from informal community groups to take over services and 
assets. However, a more careful consideration of what asset transfers involved 
discouraged these groups’ participation. A politician recalled a story of a woman 
running a youth-training TSO: 
I put her in touch with the Council about possibly taking over the [name of play 
centre]...Two things happened.  One is she said the Council said, ‘Could you 
take over all the other play centres as well?’  It was like, ‘No.  Don’t have the 
capacity for that’. But that tells you that they [Council] had some concerns about 
the capacity of the sort of friends of play centres in other parts of the city.  
Number two, she’s decided she doesn’t want to take on the liabilities that go 
with taking on these existing centres. (P/C_5)   
The challenges mentioned revealed that the city council’s traditional protocols of 
monitoring and complying with regulation had to become more flexible to nurture civil 
society empowerment and creativity to fulfil rollback redux. In this transition, two 
aspects began to indicate change.  Firstly, that new regulation had to find a balance 





procedures followed by community organizations who lacked sufficient administrative 
and managerial capacity to respond to all regulatory and legislative requirements. 
Secondly, an acknowledgment that some of the services run by TSOs would cease 
to be free as many of these TSOs did not have the economies of scale to absorb the 
wages and infrastructure that the council used to support.  
The implications of these challenges revealed the vulnerability of Cardiff Council in 
relation to civil society, which perceived itself as empowered. As new agreements of 
collaboration and commissioning were negotiated with civil society and TSOs, the 
role of the council was questioned in setting ‘the rules’ and therefore its skills in 
buffering conflict began to show signs of cracks.  This situation was not necessarily 
experienced in Donostia, as untouched provision of social services, accompanied by 
a national discourse of austerity prompted the regional government to restate, 
whenever possible, its protagonist role through centralized responsibility. 
 
C. d) Placebo dependency, new spaces of negotiation and legitimation 
In Cardiff, the imperative to-be-seen-to-be-acting was observed in the Cardiff 
Debate, launched in mid-2014. It was a three-year programme of events, workshops 
and discussions on the future of public services involving the Cardiff Council, partner 
agencies and local communities across the city. In its first year, which coincided with 
the final phase of fieldwork, people were asked which services matter the most and 
to put forward ideas on how the council could do things differently to save money in 
the future. This initiative was not exhaustive, but could be claimed to be innovative as 





The Cardiff Debate helped to legitimize the role of the city council. It became crucial 
after some activist groups questioned the council’s role in responding to budget cuts 
following the end of roll-over grants to TSOs and community groups. Cardiff Council, 
of all state agencies participating in the Cardiff Partnership, was under the most 
pressure to show that it was acting fast despite being uncertain how to resolve the 
challenge of fiscal austerity. Interviewees mentioning ‘the council needed to save 
quickly’ or ‘the council was glad to get rid of play centres’ showed the urgency of the 
situation. The Cardiff Debate became a space where the negotiating power of the 
council could be affirmed, backed up by Stepping Up. Publishing guidelines, 
consulting the public in innovative ways and allowing new ideas to influence the 
council’s strategy to cope with austerity showed that the council was acting, although 
without the capacity to carry on delivering social services.  
Cardiff Council also capitalized on its past given its history of being a ‘good council’. 
The opinion of an activist is helpful in summarizing this point:  
In Wales the state has done quite a good job at protecting the public sector 
from cuts and delaying them. There is a sense that this is a Westminster 
Conservative agenda and local authorities have to deal with it. The anger is 
diffused, not all focused on the local authority…There have been consultations 
going on, a lot connected with the workforce and people getting redeployed or 
reduced hours. The local authority has done this not by engaging citizens but 
because they are decent people in public service. They like the idea of 
partnership and they don't like to be seen as the bad guy cutting stuff. (SA/C_2) 
Local councillors and officers perceived the need to rely on the council’s relatively 





resignation to fiscal austerity and the city’s long-term discourse based on partnership 
and co-production of services. This discourse was not unique to Cardiff, but to Wales 
more generally as it sought to differentiate from its English counterpart since 
devolution in 1999. 
Unlike Cardiff, there was no imperative for Donostia Council in this regard; but 
despite its unchanged budget, the council still wanted to be seen to be acting. As a 
result, it created a protectionist narrative against austerity that built upon the city’s 
participatory system and complemented the Basque protectionist welfare discourse. 
The council sought ways to be seen to be acting through tactics of participatory 
planning that did not incur expense. Through projects such as Auzolan and Auzo 
Elkarteen Bilgunea, the Bildu administration sought to legitimize its role by 
approaching neighbourhood associations that valued legacies of Basque 
communitarianism. These associations located in the south of the city had 
historically been the most marginalized. Although critical of government, they were 
the most likely to agree with its daily process of delivery while taking advantage of 
the technical assistance and training that the council offered. Of interest was local 
government officers’ perception that the relationship with these neighbourhood 
associations was not immune to the higher government level discourse of austerity. 
An officer explains: 
What I see is a social fabric, building always a relation with the [municipal] 
administration, conscientious of its limits and with a more responsible 
behaviour, with a different approach in handling themes, accepting that we can 
only reach so far; and this is important because in the bonanza years there was 
a game of demanding to the institution [municipal administration] and treating 





for…and in [the current] relationship I have seen more common sense, 
understanding that the crisis conditions the solutions that can emerge. 
(GO/D_2) 
 
B. Implication of findings 
In analyzing the preparation of the rollback redux to capture voluntarism and 
participation, followed by technicalization, we unpicked civil society and community 
participation during the liminal or transitional period between pre- and post- austerity. 
The analysis was further complemented by the direction of risk-shifting through 
procedural rules and narratives that helped identify the ‘politics’ of austerity: how it 
was portrayed, who was to blame and, especially from our data, the strategy that city 
governments used to engage with contingency.    
[table 2 here] 
The findings (Table 2) show that the two cities were preparing for a rollback redux 
(downloading and offloading) and this preparation entailed deepening 
technicalization through operative and monitoring processes that mimicked or 
narrowed the gap between local government and TSOs/community groups. Placebo 
dependency was present in both cities; however, in Cardiff it was directly associated 
with the need to be seen to respond to the immediacy of public expenditure cuts. 
Citizen participation and voluntarism in service provision fit into narratives of 
austerity resignation, while holding on to the Welsh historical reputation of a caring 
and collaborative council. The need of the Donostia Council to be seen to be acting 
locally was not an imperative due to funding cuts, but the impact of the broader 





protectionism that capitalized on the city’s participatory system, which in turn 
revitalized ideals of Basque communitarianism.    
The findings show that risk-shifting- comprised a double movement: downwards and 
beyond the state was non-linear for Donostia. This case showed a re-centralization 
of certain social-assistance initiatives by municipal government and of basic income 
support by regional government. This responded in great part to the uneven 
decentralization of welfare in Spain, which followed a paternalist-like approach in the 
Basque Country. 
However, the non-linearity of the Donostia case does not mean that neoliberal  
austerity was absent. The Donostia Council was affected by it; the negative impact of 
public infrastructure investment cuts at higher levels of government and cuts to street 
maintenance prompted the council to create new spaces of citizen participation (i.e. 
Casa de las Mujeres) as a means to seek legitimation. In these spaces, negotiation 
by neighbourhood associations was limited given their dependence on the council’s 
initiatives to create and invite participation. This dependence facilitated TSOs’ 
mimicry of government procedures that required technical and more professionalized 
regulation (i.e. business plans, outcome and monitoring reports).  The accentuated 
technicalization of TSOs was the council’s preparation strategy for an unknown but 
potential future that might resemble the linearity evident in Cardiff (see below). 
The non-linearity of the Donostia case points towards the importance of multi-level 
governance as a factor to understand the contradictions of neoliberal austerity. 
Martí-Costa and Navarro (2015:37) argue that the higher the level of government the 
more exposed it is to the effects of expenditure cuts. Our analysis confirms this, 





discourse of austerity experienced in Spain, but also the political ideology of the 
radical left in the city and its province (Gipuzkoa) reinforced the buffer. The buffer 
protected municipal social services, albeit re-centralized regional government, while 
prompting the council to do something about the city’s system of participation.  
In contrast, the Welsh case, through the CF programme and Cardiff Partnership, 
showed that risk-shifting followed a more linear path and was more attuned to the 
Anglo-American proposition stated by Peck. The Cardiff case resulted from regional 
government’s greater alignment to the UK government’s policies of down and 
offloading; however, a more symbolic resistance was found in the combination of 
fiscal resignation and partnership/co-production narratives at both regional and city 
levels. This helped to maintain the council’s legitimacy during the immediate years 
after the fiscal crisis.  
This linearity weakened Cardiff Council’s capacity to co-opt through: the reduction of 
resources to fund TSOs, the questioning of the council’s role in creating new 
regulation for deepening downloading and offloading of social services, and the need 
to organize consultation that opened spaces of negotiation with citizens and civil 
society. Nevertheless, the council relied simultaneously on quick responses that 
capitalized on previous efforts (trust, mimetism, and the city governance model) to 
keep afloat its legitimacy in times of uncertainty.  
Donostia Council showed a stronger capacity to co-opt because it continued funding 
TSOs. In this sense, Donostia seemed better to retain the ‘jewel of the crown’ 
compared to Cardiff; but in both cases the sense of national identity deployed to 
differentiate the cities from Spain and from England became a mechanism to 





of the financial crisis on local government spending was an opportunity for both 
councils to capitalize on their legacies of institutional protectionism obtained by their 
regional nationalisms. The lack of mass social protest and contestation, reflected 
through the historical trends of regional and local government funding to TSOs and 
community groups, showed the cities’ regional paternalistic approach to governance. 
However, the different devolved fiscal policies and structures in the UK and Spain 
marked the difference between the cities, and thereby the divergence in how co-
optation was experienced.  
The city comparison underlines that the fiscal dimension is not the only important 
factor in understanding how co-optive capacity upon participation fares under 
austerity, but also national identity. Although it has been argued that the question of 
identity (nationalism, race, etc.) does not work as a counterweight to the 
contradictions of a totalizing neoliberal capitalism (Wood, 2016:259), it was relevant 
in our analysis to illustrate the extent to which the structural inter-scalarity of 
governance (i.e. fiscal institutions) is complemented by the symbolic side of national 
identity found in everyday administrative practice (Basque communitarianism or 
Welsh collaboration). Although we recognize that the effects of nationalism may only 
work as a temporary resistance to austerity [4], our research highlights an important 
subtlety for understanding neoliberalism’s practical contradictions. In discovering 
how nationalism plays a role in everyday administrative practice alongside the Left 
political ideology governing the cities, our research began to unpick a way in which 
the durability of neoliberal austerity is forged and (re)embedded in periods of 







[1] Context defined by history, political ideology, government resources, economy 
and social participation/activism. These factors have been recognized in the debates 
on actually existing neoliberalism (Brenner et al., 2010; Guarneros-Meza and 
Geddes, 2010) 
[2] Service or facility-specific protests were present in both cities, but isolated and in 
smaller scale. 
[3] Social activists/TSO officers (SA/ TSO): 17 Cardiff and 10 Donostia; state officers 
(GO): 5 Cardiff and 7 Donostia; politicians (P): 7 Cardiff and 7 Donostia. Of the 53 
interviewees, 6 were interviewed twice, representing evenly the three types of 
participants. 
[4] At the time of writing, the recentralization led by the Basque Government had 
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Table 1. Austerity co-optive factors 
Austerity urbanism  Co-optive capacity  
Roll-back redux (roll-back of partnership 
sponsorships) 
Citizen capture through partnership working 
Austerity governance (extended forms of 
management) 
Technicalisation and professionalism of 
administrative processes 
Risk shifting (mechanisms of down and off- 
loading) 
Buffering conflict in spaces of community 
self-management 
Placebo dependency (mismatch between 
capacity to act and acting) 








Table 2. Findings from the two cities 
Co-optive austerity  Cardiff Donostia 
Flexing the muscles of 
capture 
After capturing participation 
through partnership, the 
council stops financing 
TSOs.  
After capturing participation 
through partnership, the 




Technicalization of TSOs 
increases: business-like 
procedures; TSOs influence 
decisions; and new 
regulations for 
commissioning services are 
required. 






Risk-shifting and buffering 
conflict  
The council is more 
exposed to TSOs’ higher 
level of negotiation. As 
offloading increases, its role 
is required to buffer 
tensions and provide 
advice.  
TSOs’ level of negotiation is 
low as they depend on 
council’s resources. Basque  
 government’s 
recentralization of social 
services works as a buffer 
favouring the council. 
Placebo dependency and 
legitimacy 
The council responds to the 
immediacy of cuts, whilst 
holding on to the narrative 
of Welsh collaboration. 
The council’s reaction is not 
imperative to cuts, but it 
responds to austerity 
through participation and 
Basque communitarianism. 
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